Broken Access Control Checklist | Find and Fix OWASP A01

Broken access control occurs when an application fails to enforce its intended permissions, including for anonymous callers. Enforce authorization at the trusted server or database boundary for protected operations. Choose ownership, role, membership, or other checks that match the access model. Hiding buttons or obscuring URLs does not enforce those rules.
These live figures describe all scanned sites. They do not establish prevalence for an AI-built subgroup, compare development methods, or attribute findings to AI generation.
The average security score across the 127 live sites SimplyScan has scanned is 86 out of 100.
32% of the 127 live sites SimplyScan has scanned (41 sites) have at least one high or critical security issue.
An average score does not establish whether an individual app implements the access controls it needs.
What Is Broken Access Control?
Broken access control, or authorization failure, occurs when a web application grants access to content and functions to users who should not have them. Broken Access Control is the A01 category in the OWASP Top 10 (2021). Test authorization behavior directly.
Authentication asks “Who are you?”; authorization asks “What are you allowed to do?” An authorization failure may let a caller:
- Read another user’s private data without permission.
- Execute an administrative action without the required role.
- Modify or delete a record outside the intended sharing rules.
- Bypass a UI restriction by sending a request directly.
For apps built with Lovable, Bolt.new, or Cursor, test server-side authentication and authorization for each protected operation. For related risks, see our OWASP Top 10 for AI-built apps.
Examples to Test in Vibe-Coded Apps
Review generated code and deployment configuration independently of whether the visible features work.
1. Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)
An app might expose a profile through example.com/api/users/501. If a caller changes the identifier from 501 to 502 and receives another user’s private data without permission, the endpoint has an authorization flaw. For privately owned records, verify how the server relates owner_id to the trusted session.user_id; shared records need the appropriate membership checks.
2. UI-Only Admin Protection
Hiding the /admin navigation link does not restrict the underlying actions. If /api/admin/delete-user accepts an unauthorized caller’s request, the action remains exposed even though the button is hidden. See our guide on architecture security risks.
3. Missing Row-Level Security (RLS)
In platforms like Supabase, the "anon" key is public. With RLS disabled, access depends on table privileges; it is not automatically public. You can learn how to lock this down in our Supabase security checklist.
4. Client-Side Role Manipulation
A client-controlled role value such as role: "user" can be changed to "admin". The server must obtain permissions from a trusted source rather than accepting that assertion. A JWT debugger can inspect claims, but decoding a token does not verify them; validate the token’s signature and required claims in the application before relying on it.
The Broken Access Control Checklist
Use this checklist to audit your application before shipping. Every "Yes" should be backed by a server-side implementation, not just a frontend UI change.
Object-Level Access (IDOR Prevention)
- Does each protected resource request verify the caller’s permission, including any intended sharing?
- If opaque identifiers are used to reduce enumeration, are permission checks still enforced?
- Are uploads and downloads covered by the intended access rules?
- Do list endpoints return only records and fields the caller may access?
Function-Level Access
- Do protected operations check the required role or permission on the server?
- Are administrative actions denied to callers without that authority?
- Are roles granted only the permissions needed for their purpose?
- Do sensitive operations require appropriate confirmation or re-authentication, with CSRF protection where ambient browser credentials are used? See the CSRF guide.
- Is access denied unless the operation’s intended rules permit it?
Data Layer Security
- For tables exposed through a data API, are privileges and RLS policies appropriate to the intended access?
- Where policies use
auth.uid(), do tests confirm allowed and denied access for each relevant role? - Can anonymous requests access only data intended to be public?
- Are service-role credentials kept server-side, with explicit permission checks in user-facing functions that use them?
- Have you checked view ownership and security settings rather than assuming views apply the caller’s table policies?
Session and Token Integrity
- Are JWT signatures and required claims, including expiration, issuer, and audience, validated before the application relies on them?
- Are permissions obtained from a trusted database record or validated token claim rather than an unchecked request field?
- Does logout invalidate the relevant session, and have you considered the remaining lifetime of already issued access tokens?
- Are session cookies configured with
HttpOnlyandSecurewhere appropriate to restrict script access and transmission? - Is there a tested way to revoke compromised access within the time your application requires?
How to Test for Broken Access Control
The Two-Account Test
- Create two accounts: User A and User B.
- Log in as User A and create a private record (e.g., a note or an invoice).
- Copy the ID or URL of that record.
- Log in as User B and try to access that ID or URL.
- If User B can see or edit the record, you have an IDOR vulnerability.
Direct API Testing
Use a tool like curl to test protected endpoints without a token and with a low-privilege test token. Run destructive examples only against authorized test accounts and records in a test environment.
# Attempting to access an admin endpoint with a standard user token
curl -X DELETE https://your-app.com/api/admin/users/1 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer [USER_B_TOKEN]"A denied request may return 403 Forbidden or 401 Unauthorized; some APIs deliberately conceal resource existence. A 200 OK alone does not prove an authorization failure: inspect the response and verify whether the protected action occurred.
Testing Supabase RLS
For a Supabase project using a legacy anon key, this request tests anonymous read access to the profiles endpoint. The response alone does not tell you whether RLS is enabled:
curl 'https://your-project.supabase.co/rest/v1/profiles?select=*' \
-H "apikey: YOUR_PUBLIC_ANON_KEY" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_PUBLIC_ANON_KEY"If a request returns data that should be private, inspect the request role, table privileges, RLS state, applicable policies, and any bypass privileges. For more on this, see RLS policies explained.
How to Fix Broken Access Control
Enforce authorization on each protected operation using the application’s intended access model. Add database-level restrictions where they fit the architecture.
Enforce the Intended Access in Queries
For a privately owned record, a query’s WHERE clause can include the trusted user identity as well as the record ID. Do not copy WHERE user_id = current_user without checking its meaning: in PostgreSQL, current_user identifies the database role, which may be shared by many application users. Use the identity and policy appropriate to your schema.
Implement Server-Side Permission Checks
Centralize permission checks where practical, and verify that all protected routes invoke them. Middleware helps organize checks, but its presence does not prove that every path is covered.
Use Opaque Identifiers Where Appropriate
Random identifiers can make sequential enumeration harder. They can still be disclosed or obtained through other endpoints, so enforce authorization even when a caller knows an object’s ID.
Centralize Authorization Logic
Don't scatter if (user.isAdmin) checks throughout your codebase. Use a centralized library or service to handle permission logic so it can be updated in one place.
Enable RLS as a Backstop
RLS can restrict database operations performed by roles subject to its policies. It does not constrain bypass roles, and it does not enforce rules for actions that do not pass through those database checks.
Automated Detection and Monitoring
Automated checks can reveal selected public exposures. Missing security headers and exposed secrets are separate findings; they do not by themselves establish an object-level authorization failure.
SimplyScan checks a live URL in about 30 seconds for recognized secret patterns, selected anonymous backend exposures, and security headers. It does not sign in as different users or establish that the application’s authorization rules are correct.
Assess performance separately when changing an access rule. A correct permission check does not automatically make a query faster.
Use the vibe coding security checklist alongside source review and application-specific authorization tests. A completed checklist does not prove that every access-control flaw is resolved.
Pro Monitoring includes Pro scan credits for full reports. See pricing for the allowance associated with your chosen option.
SimplyScan Pro Monitoring also includes scheduled rescans with change alerts. Review any new findings and repeat the application-specific authorization tests after relevant changes.
FAQ
What is the difference between broken access control and broken authentication? Authentication verifies identity; authorization determines which actions a caller may perform. In the OWASP Top 10 (2021), authentication failures and broken access control are separate categories. A valid login does not authorize access to another user’s private data.
What is an IDOR vulnerability?
IDOR stands for Insecure Direct Object Reference. It occurs when an application uses an identifier (like a database ID) to access an object directly without checking if the user has permission. For example, changing ?id=123 to ?id=124 in a URL to see someone else's private profile is a classic IDOR.
What is broken access control? Broken Access Control (A01) is an OWASP Top 10 category. Check authorization and record ownership on each protected operation.
How do I test for privilege escalation? To test for vertical privilege escalation, attempt to access admin-only URLs or API endpoints using a standard user account. To test for horizontal privilege escalation, use two standard accounts and try to access or modify Account A's data while logged into Account B.
What is missing function-level access control?
This occurs when an application executes a protected action without checking the caller’s permission. Hiding a button is insufficient if a direct request to an action such as /admin/delete-all still performs the operation for an unauthorized caller.
Can RLS alone prevent broken access control? RLS restricts database operations for roles subject to its policies. It does not constrain bypass roles or protect actions that do not pass through the database. Combine appropriate database policies with server-side authorization and tests of the application’s access rules.
Sources
Every figure above was checked against the page it cites · here they are, so you can check them too.
Show 2 sources
- community.owasp.org › Broken_Access_Control
Access control, sometimes called authorization, is how a web application grants access to content and functions to some users and not others.
- ruggeamey.medium.com › owasp-top-10-learn-it-the-hard-way-a01-broken-access-contro…
Never trust object IDs coming from the client. Always enforce authorisation on every request. Verify.
Frequently asked questions
/api/admin/delete endpoint. Security must be enforced at the API level, not the UI level.Is your app secure? Run a free security scan in 30 seconds · free account required.
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